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ABSTRACT
The Federal Circuit’s Markman decision removed
juries from the claim interpretation process, thereby
revolutionizing patent law. Designed to provide greater
certainty and predictability, Markman nevertheless
produced unintended consequences, increasing ambiguity
and complexity. By declaring claim interpretation an
entirely legal issue, the Federal Circuit imposed intricate
and even contradictory rules, many resulting from the
Federal Circuit’s long insistence that no issues of fact
existed, so that claim construction was entirely subject to
de novo review. The uncertainty was compounded by rules
focused on semantic quibbles unrelated to what was
invented. Increased burdens and continuing uncertainty
followed.
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INTRODUCTION
Three tectonic shifts have marked the last seventy years in
patent litigation. The first resulted from the 1952 patent act, which
untangled the law and codified a liberal view of how much
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“invention” was needed for patentability. The second was the
creation of the Federal Circuit, which removed patent appeals from
the disinterested or even hostile regional circuit courts, especially
the rabidly anti-patent Eighth Circuit. The third came from the
Federal Circuit’s decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc.,1 which separated claim construction from the jury’s
infringement analysis. Of the three, Markman continues to have
the greatest impact, with crucial questions still unresolved after
twenty years.
Markman was ostensibly intended to produce greater clarity
and predictability in patent cases by placing the interpretation of a
patent’s scope solely in the hands of judges—who were asserted to
be better suited to the intricacies of claim interpretation.
Underlying the ostensible grounds was a deep enmity toward
jurors in patent cases and a desire for unimpeded Federal Circuit
review of patent scope, a desire that had been thwarted by the rise
of patent juries. Yet Markman produced a host of unexpected
results: less predictability, district judge irritation, and ever
increasing litigation costs. But most important was the
transformation of claim analysis from a focus on the invention to
an elaborate manipulation of words unhinged from the purpose of
the patent system. Despite twenty years of refinement, Markman’s
legacy remains a difficult work-in-progress.
I. THE ROAD TO MARKMAN
Markman arose in response to increasing use of juries,
especially following the creation of the Federal Circuit. Once jury
trials began to predominate, dissatisfaction with the competence of
juries mushroomed, especially among losing defendants and
attorneys representing companies who had long ignored patents.
The dissatisfaction grew further as the Federal Circuit transformed
patent law from a mostly-ignored backwater into an economic
force, while simultaneously endorsing a broad role for juries.
Attorneys, corporate counsel, and academics, appalled at juror
attitudes, jury nullification and juror damage awards, thus sought a
1

52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
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way to thwart the juror virus. Simultaneously, the limited review of
jury decisions frustrated attorneys and some Federal Circuit
judges. The United States Constitution’s Seventh Amendment2
imposed a serious obstacle to jury elimination,3 so jury opponents
looked for a new route to limiting juries. The result was Markman,
an inelegant tool that limited the role of juries but created a host of
new problems.
A. The Rise of Patent Juries
Juries have long been present in patent cases, even before the
adoption of the Constitution in 1789,4 and the passage of the first
patent act in 1790.5 Yet until the late 1970s, juries in patent cases
were the rare exception. Patent attorneys and their clients had little
experience with juries and jury trials, and were reluctant to deviate
from common practice. Then, as now, many patent specialists
2

U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved . . . .”).
3
E.g., Jacob v. City of New York, 315 U.S. 752, 752–53 (1942) (“The
right of jury trial in civil cases at common law is a basic and fundamental
feature of our system of federal jurisprudence which is protected by the Seventh
Amendment. A right so fundamental and sacred to the citizen, whether
guaranteed by the Constitution or provided by statute, should be jealously
guarded by the courts.”); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)
(“Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and
occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence than any seeming
curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost
care.”); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830) (“The trial by jury
is justly dear to the American people. It has always been an object of deep
interest and solicitude, and every encroachment upon it has been watched with
great jealousy.”).
4
E.g., Winans v. New York & Erie R.R. Co., 62 U.S. (21 How.) 88, 100
(1859); Parker v. Hulme, 18. F. Cas. 1138 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) (No. 10,740);
Turner v. Winter, [1787] 99 Eng. Rep. 1274 (K.B.); Arkwright v. Nightingale,
[1785] 1 Carp. P.C. 38 (C.P.); Liardet v. Johnson, [1778] 1 Carp. P.C. 35 (K.B.)
(discussed in 1 JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE
GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 748 (1992)).
5
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109–12 (1790). The Act provided,
among other things, that the patent owner can be awarded “such damages as
shall be assessed by a jury . . . .”
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viewed juries with alarm; they were considered incompetent to
handle complex technology, and the specialists assumed federal
judges, all of whom had higher than average intelligence, were
more suited to dealing with the technical and legal esoterica arising
in nearly every patent case. Moreover, a general movement
challenging the suitability of juries in complex cases gained
momentum in the 1970s,6 giving patent litigants further
ammunition to try to avoid juries.7
Despite the common disdain for patent juries, a
countermovement arose in the 1970s, based upon a simple belief:
jurors decided patent cases differently from judges, and that
difference benefited patent owners more than defendants.8 That
6

Much of the movement arose after the famous footnote 10 in Ross v.
Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970), which seemed to suggest that the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury hinged, in part, on “the practical abilities and
limitations of juries.” Id. at 538 n.10. District courts then rejected juries in
complex cases in a late 70s flurry, e.g., ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM,
458 F. Supp. 423, 448 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79
F.R.D. 59, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litig., 75 F.R.D. 702,
705 (S.D. Cal. 1977); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D.
Wash. 1976). The movement culminated in the Third Circuit’s decision in In re
Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir.
1980), holding that the Fifth Amendment due process clause created a
“complexity” exception to the right to jury trials in civil cases. Many scholars
called for the end of juries in complex cases. E.g., James S. Campbell, Complex
Cases and Jury Trials: A Reply to Professor Arnold, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 965
(1980); Kathy E. Davidson, The Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Litigation, 20
WM. & MARY L. REV. 329 (1978). The issue was not formally resolved by the
Supreme Court, and the “complexity” exception remains the subject of
discussion even today. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide if
Patents are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV. 1673 (2013).
7
See, e.g., Gary M. Ropski, Constitutional and Procedural Aspects of the
Use of Juries in Patent Litigation (Part I), 58 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
609, 616 (1976) (“Ross may provide support for the argument that the right to
jury trial can be limited by the inability of jurors to understand the complex
patents and technology at issue.”).
8
Early commenters suggested that juries should be considered when
sympathy is desired for individual inventors or when the defendant is a large
corporation. See, e.g., George B. Newitt & Jon O. Nelson, The Patent Lawyer
and Trial by Jury, 1 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 59 (1967). The evidence
that jurors are pro-patent is now well-established. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley,
Jamie Kendall & Clint Martin, Rush to Judgment? Trial Length and Outcomes
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difference in outcomes swept most opposition aside. Before the
1970s, juries rarely appeared in even 10% of the trials.9 By the end
of the 1970s, patent cases were tried to juries in at least 10%,10 and
that number steadily increased to 70% by 1994, 11 the year before
Markman. Despite the ever-present disdain for juror competence,
most patent litigators concluded by the mid-1980s that proper
representation of patent owners required a jury demand. Patent jury
trials then became the norm,12 no doubt spurred by high profile
plaintiff jury wins, such as the celebrated decision in Roberts v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co.13 Patent litigators were forced to scramble to
in Patent Cases, 41 AIPLA Q.J. 169 (2013); John R. Allison & Mark A.
Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J.
185, 213 (1998) (“[J]uries are likely to favor patentees and unlikely to secondguess the decision of the PTO.”). Interestingly, articles discussing the
phenomenon were non-existent in the 1970s, although the author remembers the
topic as one of frequent discussion in patent circles by 1980. An example is
Ropski, supra note 7, at 612, which merely noted that “the sight of the ribbon
and seal on the official Letters Patent impresses the jury with the presumption of
validity.” It may be that practitioners began recognizing the possibilities
described in scholarly articles in the 1960s, e.g., Ralph W. Launius, Some
Aspects of the Right to Trial by Jury in Patent Cases, 49 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 112 (1967).
9
ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND
PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 123 (Princeton University Press 2004).
The Supreme Court noted in Blonder–Tongue Lab. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402
U.S. 313, 336 n.30 (1971), that only 13 of 382 patent trials between 1968 and
1970 were tried to a jury.
10
Id. See also HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ & ROBERT J GOLDMAN, PATENT LAW
AND PRACTICE 130 (2d. ed. 1995) (tabulating data).
11
Id.
12
An excellent discussion of the transition from bench to jury trials in
patent cases is contained in Lemley, supra note 6, at 1675.
13
723 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1983). Roberts, a non-practicing inventor, sued
Sears in 1977 for infringement of his patent on a quick-release socket wrench.
The jury found the then unusual sum of $5 million in damages, which was
increased by the district court to $8,190,254. Id. at 1328–29. The case generated
much then unheard of press publicity for a patent case, including an article in
Time magazine. See Wrenching Sears, TIME, Oct. 23, 1978, available at
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,946093,00.html. Interestingly, the key holding by the Seventh Circuit was that patent validity was a legal
issue, such that jurors could not decide validity in patent cases. Roberts, 723
F.2d at 1343. The Seventh Circuit also noted, without citation, that
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gain jury skills in the 1980s, as trials conducted by non-patent
specialists (who understood juries) produced repeated victories for
patent owners—in cases where traditional thinking suggested that
judges would have decided for the defendant.
The Federal Circuit’s birth in 1982 cemented the role of juries
in patent suits.14 Created to provide greater uniformity in patent
law (among other things), the Federal Circuit immediately began
resolving the patent law differences that had existed among the
regional circuits.15 The Federal Circuit, however, did not see a
need to limit the role of juries in patent cases. Despite the Seventh
Circuit’s 1983 holding that juries could not decide patent validity
or interpret patent claims,16 the Federal Circuit declined all early
opportunities to restrain juries. Instead, the Federal Circuit roundly
approved of juries in patent cases at its first opportunity.17 The
“[c]onstruction of the patent claim . . . is a matter of law for the court,” thereby
anticipating Markman by twelve years. Id. at 1338.
14
The Federal Circuit was created by the Federal Courts Improvement Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25, 37–39 (1982). It decided its first case
on October 28, 1982. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368 (1982).
15
Those differences included substantial hostility to patents. Perhaps the
best expression of that hostility can be found in a Congressional study, which
concluded: “If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the
basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend
instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would
be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend
abolishing it.” STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECON. REVIEW
OF THE PATENT SYS. 80 (Comm. Print 1958) (prepared by Fritz Machlup,
Department of Political Economy, Johns Hopkins University). The hostility is
generally outlined in Martin J. Adelman, The New World of Patents Created by
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 979,
980–81 (1987).
16
Roberts, 723 F.2d at 1332. Much of the initial work of the Federal Circuit
focused on eliminating the conflicts created by the regional circuits, a task the
Federal Circuit accomplished quickly. See Howard T. Markey, The Federal
Circuit and Congressional Intent, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 577 (1992).
17
Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Among other things, the Federal Circuit (Markey, C.J.) stated “[n]o warrant
appears for distinguishing the submission of legal questions to a jury in patent
cases from such submissions routinely made in other types of cases. So long as
the Seventh Amendment stands, the right to a jury trial should not be rationed,
nor should particular issues in particular types of case be treated differently from
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Federal Circuit thereafter repeatedly affirmed use of juries in
patent cases, including jury construction of claim terms.18
Combined with a distinctly more “pro-patent” outlook than had
been exhibited by the regional circuits,19 the Federal Circuit’s
decisions quickly cemented a prominent juror role in patent cases.
Juries, once an oddity, now dominated the patent world.
B. Hostility to Patent Juries
The ascension of patent juries was matched by a growing
similar issues in other types of cases.” Id. The Federal Circuit’s first Chief Judge
also expressly opined in dicta against eliminating patent juries based upon the
alleged “complexity” exception: “We discern no authority and no compelling
need to apply in patent infringement suits for damages a ‘complexity’ exception
denying litigants their constitutional right under the Seventh Amendment.” SRI
Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (addendum
opinion by Chief Judge Markey, joined by Judge Newman).
18
E.g., Delta X Corp. v. Baker Hughes Prod. Tools, Inc., 984 F.2d 410, 415
(Fed. Cir. 1993); Lemulson v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1206–07 (Fed.
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 976 (1993); Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Promo
Produkt Und Marketing Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir.
1991); Snellman v. Ricoh Co., 862 F.2d 283, 287–88 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 491 U.S. 910 (1989); Perini Am., Inc. v. Paper Converting Mach. Co.,
832 F.2d 581, 584 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Tillotson, Ltd. v. Walbro Corp., 831 F.2d
1033 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Tandon Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 831 F.2d
1017 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Vieau v. Japax, Inc., 823 F.2d 1510 (Fed. Cir. 1987);
Data Line Corp. v. Micro Techs., Inc., 813 F.2d 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1987); H.H.
Robertson Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384 (Fed. Cir. 1987);
Moeller v. Ionetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Palumbo v. Don-Joy
Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park
Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Bio-Rad Labs., Inc. v. Nicolet
Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604, 613 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1037 (1984); McGill, Inc. v. John Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666, 672 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
19
See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Empirical
Analysis of the Patent Court, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 112 (2004). Several press
articles in the 1980s noted the increasing importance of patents resulting from
the Federal Circuit’s creation. Jill Andresky, A Weapon at Last, FORBES, Mar.
10, 1986, at 46; Anthony Baldo, Juries Love the Patent Holder, FORBES, June
17, 1985, at 147; Toni Mack, A Change in the Legal Climate, FORBES, Oct. 7,
1985, at 41; Nancy Perry & David Kirkpatrick, The Surprising New Power of
Patents, FORTUNE, June 23, 1986, at 57; Work, Inventors’ Just Rewards, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 3, 1986, at 43.

2015]

MARKMAN TWENTY YEARS LATER:
TWENTY YEARS OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

257

chorus of criticism. Then and now, jurors were assumed
incompetent to handle patent complexities,20 and every losing
party in a jury trial blamed the result, at least in part, on jury
incompetence. Even more damning (from the jury opponent’s
perspective), jury decisions were hard for the Federal Circuit to
overturn, a phenomenon that was partially blamed on the absence
of a written opinion, which prevented identification of any
particular flaw in the jury’s chain of reasoning. On a broader front,
the entire concept of juries in patent cases was deemed irrational; a
steady drumbeat of criticism thus arose, all demanding that jurors
be restrained.21 All challenges to juries in patent cases were
ignored when the first Chief Judge, Howard Markey, administered
the Federal Circuit; Judge Markey’s 1989 retirement opened the
door to changes, leading first to In re Lockwood,22 then to the
revolution in Markman.
1. Incompetence and Unpredictability
The leading criticism of patent juries was (and is) that they
simply lack the competence to effectively resolve matters that
combined convoluted law, complex technology, and intricate
facts.23 Often without any data, commentators ridiculed patent
20

A district judge once stated when participating in a panel discussion:
“Honest to God, I don’t see how you could try a patent matter to a jury. . . . It’s
like somebody hit you between your eyes with a four-by-four. It’s factually so
complicated.” Symposium, Judicial Panel Discussions on Science and the Law,
25 CONN. L. REV. 1127, 1144 (1993) (comments of Alfred V. Covello, J.). See
also JAFFE, supra note 9, at 195 (describing “the uncontroversial observation
that the evidence in a patent case can be highly technical, and the average juror
has little competence to understand and evaluate it”).
21
E.g., Adelman supra note 15, at 1004–07.
22
50 F.3d 966 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. Am. Airlines, Inc. v.
Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995). Lockwood ruled that a Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial existed in declaratory judgment actions seeking patent
invalidity, based upon a conclusion that a right to a jury decision on validity
existed when validity was a defense to an infringement charge. Id. at 976. The
Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit decision after the patent owner
withdrew his jury demand.
23
As early as 1971, litigants argued that “patent cases are too complicated
and difficult for a jury to deal with.” Tights, Inc. v. Stanley, 441 F.2d 336, 340
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juries as irrational,24 and derided the growing trend to demand a
jury in every patent complaint. Simultaneously, jurors were
deemed unwilling to exert the effort needed to dig into the
complex law, facts and technology. Instead, jurors were assumed
to be consumed by boredom in patent cases, such that they paid no
attention at trial and thus were incapable of rendering a just verdict
even if they had been competent.25
Patent jurors were also deemed unpredictable.26 Critics
reasoned that, if jurors did not understand the case and did not pay
attention to the testimony, surely they used a random,
unfathomable process to reach a conclusion.27 The public was
thereby deprived of any ability to assess the breadth or validity of
any given patent, and was without “notice” of the patent’s scope.
These criticisms were frequently expressed by losing litigants, who
were dismayed that any jury could have found the accused product
to be within the asserted patent. And underlying the criticism was
indignation at those jurors and lawyers who, untutored in the
mysteries of patent esoterica, would nevertheless trespass on the
domain of those specialists who had earned their place in the
patent hierarchy by enduring years of study and training in the
(4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 852 (1971). See also Ropski, supra note
7, at 632 (referring to “juror befuddlement and confusion”).
24
E.g., Ropski, supra note 7, at 632 (“[T]he jury’s lack of technological
competence forces their potential decision to be the result of chance, not
reasoned analysis of the evidence presented at trial.”).
25
See, for example, the statements of a prominent New York practitioner,
Albert Fey, who commented that “This stuff is even complicated for someone
with a Ph.D. in engineering . . . . A jury’s eyes glaze over.” Bloomberg Business
News, Jury Cases on Patent Infringement on Trial, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 12,
1995, at 2.
26
Perhaps the leading criticism came in 1993 from a sitting judge on the
Federal Circuit. See Paul R. Michel, The Challenge Ahead: Increasing
Predictability in Federal Circuit Jurisprudence for the New Century, 43 AM. U.
L. REV. 1231 (1993). Judge Michel described claim interpretation by jurors as a
major source of unpredictability and called for construction by judges. Id. at
1238–39. Interestingly, Judge Michel described predictability as more important
than fairness where economic rights were at stake. Id. at 1234.
27
E.g., Ropski, supra note 7, at 610 (noting that attorneys “may have been
uneasy about placing important cases in the hands of fact-finders who might
only guess at the correct decision, or base it upon considerations collateral to the
facts in evidence”).
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glories of patent intricacies.28 The specialists were particularly
affronted by trial lawyers who lacked the specialists’ particularized
expertise but who nevertheless proved adept at mesmerizing
gullible jurors.
While a few practitioners relished the opportunity to practice
before juries, patent juries were so roundly criticized that few
challenged the accepted belief that patent cases would be fairer,
and more predictable, if all decisions were made by legally trained
and experienced judges.
2. The Unreviewable “Black Box”
Equally damning in the eyes of the critics was the inability to
review the logic of jury decisions. Considered a “black box,” jury
verdicts were the result of an unknown process, hidden in the
confines of the jury deliberation room. Worse, jury verdicts were
upheld on appeal unless they were unsupported by substantial
evidence. Losing litigants (who were often losing defendants) felt
helpless on appeal, since they were unable to identify logical flaws
in juror reasoning, and they faced a heavy burden in their attempts
to overcome verdicts that had at least moderate evidentiary
support. This was an especially egregious problem when juries
decided the legal aspects of mixed questions of law and fact.
In contrast, judicial trial decisions require detailed findings of
fact and conclusions of law, allowing appellate litigants to
knowledgeably focus the appellate court on the trial judge’s
alleged errors. No assumptions need be made regarding what facts
the trial judge accepted or rejected, and the judge’s legal
conclusions provide an exact map of the analysis leading to the
judgment. While findings of fact are reviewed under the “clear
error” standard, judicial conclusions of law are reviewed de novo,
allowing losing defendants a second bite of the apple. The
increasing damages awards in the 1980s and early 1990s added
incentives for defendants who lost at trial to take any actions
possible to reign in the jury scourge. Together, these factors
28

E.g., id. at 613 (noting “the general attitude of the bar, including the
judiciary, that the patentee’s request for a jury trial is an indication that the
patent is weak”).
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provided a steady pool of bitter opponents of patent juries.
3. The “Irrational” System
Juries in patent cases were also derided as fundamentally
irrational. A priori, no rationally created legal system would place
the ultimate decision in high-technology issues with material
economic and social impact on a near random selection of
ignorant, untrained, and even occasionally uneducated citizens. In
the critics’ view, it would be hard to design a less logical approach
to resolution of high-stakes technology disputes. The “it’s
irrational” argument was rarely accompanied by reference to
methodical research demonstrating the unsuitability of juries.29 It
was, instead, stated as an indisputable fact. The argument
nevertheless helped fuel the groundswell of opposition to patent
juries.
And it all seemed so unnecessary to jury critics.
Acknowledging that the Seventh Amendment guaranteed a right to
civil jury trials, critics nevertheless pointed to exceptions that, at
least in their view, demonstrated that the Constitution did not grant
a jury right in patent cases. This was most notable in the writing of
Professor Adelman, who not only excoriated the use of juries, but
vigorously argued that the Seventh Amendment did not apply—
despite the support for juries expressed by the Federal Circuit.30
29

If juries do not decide issues, then they are decided by judges, and
scholarly research exists suggesting that judges’ decisions suffer from many
drawbacks that make it hard to characterize them as better decision makers than
juries. E.g., Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to
Judges: A Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469 (2005). The
article notes the “striking similarities in the decision making of judges and
jurors,” and concludes that “judges and jurors generally appear to be influenced
by similar factors and suffer from many of the same difficulties in making their
decisions.” Id. at 509.
30
Professor Adelman first criticized juries in a 1987 article, suggesting that
“there is little room for juries in patent cases,” noting that judges have “greater
intelligence and better training, coupled with the ability to control the pace of
the trial and to study transcript and relevant documents outside the courtroom . .
. .” Adelman, supra note 15, at 979. He further characterized jury use as
“unfortunate for the system’s integrity,” because of the “inherent irrationality of
juries.” Id. at 1006. He reiterated that criticism in 1989 in an article on the
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The battle lines were drawn, and it only remained to be seen
whether the pro- or anti-jury forces would prevail.
C. Lockwood
The first skirmish occurred in In re Lockwood,31 a decision on
rehearing after a Federal Circuit panel granted a petition for
mandamus requiring a jury trial on validity. The panel concluded
that the Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial “on
factual questions relating to validity,”32 and extended the jury trial
right to declaratory judgment actions for invalidity, even where
infringement was no longer at issue.33 The decision was consistent
with past Federal Circuit support for juries, and the refusal of the
full Federal Circuit to reconsider the issue en banc seemed a strong
indication that the Federal Circuit would preserve a prominent role
for patent juries.34 The strength of that trend, however, was
weakened by a ringing dissent by Judge Nies, joined by Chief
Judge Archer and Judge Plager,35 who used Lockwood to promote
their belief that some patent issues could be taken from juries, even
if juries could not be entirely banished from patent matters.
Judge Nies’s dissent identified three grounds for preventing
juries from ruling on patent validity, based upon the importance of
public rights, the lack of a declaratory judgment route to invalidity
in English common law before adoption of the Constitution, and
policy grounds that Judge Nies said favored judges over patent
doctrine of equivalents, suggesting that problems with the doctrine are
“exacerbated when juries, whose members usually lack both technological and
legal training.” Adelman, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: Questions
that Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 682 n.34 (1989). He
continued his criticism after Markman, saying, for example, that “[n]o sane
country would create a jury system for complex patent trials . . . .” Adelman,
Patent Claiming in the United States: Central, Peripheral, or Mongrel?, 1
INTELL. PROP. THEORY 71, 73 (2010).
31
50 F.3d 966 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. American Airlines, Inc. v.
Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995).
32
Id. at 976.
33
Id.
34
See cases cited supra note 18.
35
50 F.3d at 980.
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juries.36 Of the three, the “public rights” argument became a key
aspect of Markman and represented part of the foundation for
Markman’s fact–law distinction. According to Judge Nies, “the
denomination of an issue as one of law represents a policy decision
that a judge is more appropriate than a jury to make the
decision.”37 She also lamented the “black box” of jury room
decisions,38 and noted that “only a reasoned decision lays the
foundation for meaningful review.”39 She ended by mourning the
Federal Circuit precedent that “has been read to require jury
resolution,” such that “litigants no longer challenge the propriety
of giving the issue of validity to the jury.”40 These strong words,
coupled with the rejection of rehearing en banc, anticipated the
sharp division of the Federal Circuit’s coming decisions on claim
construction.
With that background, the stage was set for Markman.
II. MARKMAN
Markman arose from severe hostility to juries—as Judge
Mayer said in his concurring opinion: “this is not just about claim
language, it is about ejecting juries from infringement cases.”41
Most jury opponents wanted complete elimination of patent juries,
but juries were so abhorred that any limitation of their role seemed
a worthwhile goal. This dynamic played out in Federal Circuit
jurisprudence. In a prophetic 1983 analysis of the Federal Circuit,
Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit predicted “deep ‘theoretical
cleavages’ in patent theory over whether patents should be
construed liberally to stimulate innovation or narrowly to decrease
the monopoly power of a patent.”42 Posner’s prediction proved true
36

Id. at 981.
Id. at 990.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (Mayer, J., concurring).
42
Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until
1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56
S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 777 (1983).
37
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for the claim construction battle. Before Judge Markey’s
retirement, the Federal Circuit adhered to the belief that a
significant jury role strengthened the patent system, and any desire
among the Federal Circuit for jury limits was suppressed. A
different view dominated after his retirement: “notice” of the scope
of a patent became paramount. And since keeping patents narrow
(and even of zero scope) provides more certainty of a patent’s
scope, the opposition to the broad interpretations often adopted by
juries became a strong expression of the desire for greater notice.
Juror opponents between 1982 and 1995 thus argued multiple
grounds to limit juries, most of which were not adopted.43 But
when the Federal Circuit lost the restraint imposed by Chief Judge
Markey, the efforts to limit juries focused on the “fact–law”
distinction, which contended that claim interpretation (among other
issues) was a legal question reserved for judges.44 That view has
reasonable Supreme Court support,45 but it begged the question of
whether the ultimate legal determination of claim scope had
underlying factual issues. To many, claim interpretation seemed a
mixed question of law and fact (much like contractual
interpretation), especially when claims were construed (as the
courts had repeatedly demanded) from the perspective of one
skilled in the art.46 Undaunted, jury opponents declared that claim
construction was entirely an issue of law, which would leave no
fact-finding role for the jury. The Federal Circuit accepted the
argument in Markman. The Supreme Court side-stepped the fact–
43

The most notable limitations were imposed in Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton
Indus. Prod., Inc., 756 F.2d 1556, 1564–65 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (instructing on
remand that the “court should instruct the jury on what the claim means”);
Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 721 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (declaring that “claim interpretation [is] matter for the court to decide and
to make known to the jury by its instructions”); and Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc.,
970 F.2d 816, 822 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“Claim interpretation is a question of law
for the court.”).
44
E.g., Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 822 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
45
E.g., Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 338 (1854) (“The first
[question], what is the thing patented . . . [is] a question of law, to be determined
by the court, construing the letters patent . . . .”).
46
E.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 546 U.S. 1170 (2006).
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law argument and simply ruled that no constitutional right existed
to have juries interpret patent claims. And unintended
consequences resulted, which to this day make up a central part of
the uncertainties in patent interpretation.
A. The Federal Circuit Markman Decision
When looked at broadly, the Federal Circuit’s Markman
decision had a simple holding: “the interpretation and construction
of patent claims, which define the scope of the patentee’s rights
under the patent, is a matter of law exclusively for the court.”47
That decision, while criticized,48 was supported by precedent49 and
logic; much drama could have been averted if the Federal Circuit
had left matters at that simple statement. Instead, the Federal
Circuit added bold declarations of law and claim construction
procedure that have bedeviled the patent system for two decades.
Although the Federal Circuit’s additional statements were intended
to produce greater consistency and predictability in claim
interpretation, some statements were based upon an unrealistic
view of patent practice, and some bordered on fantasy.
The problems arose from the Court’s desire to preclude any
claim interpretation role for juries, and maximize the Federal
Circuit’s appellate review. The Federal Circuit rejected its previous
rulings that were inconsistent with the view that “claim
construction is strictly a question of law for the court.”50 It then
focused its bold statements on the fact–law distinction,51 and only
47

1995).
48

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 967 (Fed. Cir.

Circuit Judges Mayer and Rader concurred in the decision, and Circuit
Judge Newman dissented. Id. at 968. Judge Mayer agreed with the outcome but
disagreed with the rejection of juries. Id. at 989. Judge Newman disagreed with
the rejection of juries and said remand was the proper action. Id. at 1026. Judge
Rader agreed with the outcome and said that the court should not have addressed
the role of the jury. Id. at 998–99.
49
See Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330; see also Read Corp., 970 F.2d 816.
50
Markman, 52 F.3d at 977, 979.
51
Id. at 976 (“In this case which involves claim construction and a grant of
JMOL of noninfringement based on claim construction, in order to determine
whether that grant was correct, we must distinguish law from fact.”). The
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briefly mentioned public policies that supported exclusive judicial
claim interpretation.52 It avoided entirely any argument based upon
the so-called “complexity” exception to the Seventh Amendment.
That fact–law analysis led to the Federal Circuit’s most
problematic conclusion: the holding that “the construction given
the claims is reviewed de novo on appeal.”53
The Federal Circuit statements explaining claim construction in
the new, jury-free environment were numerous and varied. Having
concluded that claim construction was a pure issue of law, the
Federal Circuit then addressed the impact on the claim
construction process. Least controversial was the Federal Circuit’s
conclusion that a district court is “obligated” to construe the patent
and instruct the jury on its constructions.54 This the district court
had not done, but the Federal Circuit characterized the omission as
“harmless error.”55 The Federal Circuit did not explain why other
district courts could not follow the same procedure: give the entire
infringement question to the jury and then compare the verdict to a
proper construction of the claims. Likely driven by the Federal
Circuit’s desire to limit juries, the unexplained rejection removed
an option from patent jury practice and mandated that every jury
case have a Markman proceeding.
The Federal Circuit reiterated that the “focus” in claim
construction is still on “the objective test of what one of ordinary
skill in the art at the time of the invention would have understood
the term to mean.”56 This, of course, has been a bedrock claim
biggest precedential obstacle to this conclusion was Bischoff v Wetherand, 76
U.S. (9 Wall.) 812 (1869), which allowed the jury to determine “the character of
the thing invented” in an invalidity issue. 52 F.3d at 988. The Federal Circuit
simply punted on the issue, saying, “It is difficult, if not impossible, to discern
any legal principle from Bischoff that related to claim construction in the context
of patent infringement.” Id.
52
Id. at 978–79. The Federal Circuit also analogized claim construction to
statutory interpretation, which it characterized as an entirely legal analysis. Id. at
987.
53
Id. at 979.
54
Id. at 981–82.
55
The error was rendered harmless by the district court’s ruling on the posttrial motion. Id. at 982.
56
Id. at 986.
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interpretation principle since the creation of patent claims. Yet the
principle posed an immediate problem for the new “fact free”
claim interpretation, because determining what one of ordinary
skill “understood” has always seemed a fact-intensive, evidentiary
issue. Similarly, the court recognized the need for expert testimony
to explain the technology to the district court. That testimony again
seemed to have a distinctly factual character. Explaining how these
two fundamental aspects of claim construction were consistent
with the “entirely legal” conclusion led to Markman’s most
controversial, and problematic, statements.
Markman began by noting the established distinction between
“intrinsic” and “extrinsic” evidence.57 It then embarked on a
lengthy explanation of how extrinsic evidence may be received to
construe claims, even conflicting evidence. But the Federal Circuit
declared no factual issue ever arises from the procedure, even
when the court accepts some evidence and rejects others. The
result was a breathtaking declaration:
Through this process of construing claims by,
among other things, using certain extrinsic evidence
that the court finds helpful and rejecting other
evidence as unhelpful, and resolving disputes en
route to pronouncing the meaning of claim
language as a matter of law based on the patent
documents themselves, the court is not crediting
certain evidence over other evidence or making
factual findings.58
While stated in all seriousness, the Federal Circuit would have
been hard pressed to make a less logical proclamation. Despite the
emphatic use of the word “not,” the process described above most
certainly does involve “crediting certain evidence over other
evidence,” and no stridency can change that reality. But the bizarre
conclusion was needed (at least in the view of the Federal Circuit)
57

Id. at 980. The Federal Circuit adopted the position that the prosecution
history is part of the intrinsic evidence, id., a conclusion that presumes no
disputes will arise over the events during prosecution—a strange presumption
given the frequency of patent allowances resulting from examiner interviews.
58
Id. at 981.
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to preserve de novo review, so it became part of claim construction
law for the next two decades.
The same logic led the Federal Circuit to proclaim that a battle
of the experts does not create issues of fact or change the de novo
review standard:
When legal “experts” offer their conflicting view of
how the patent should be construed, or where the
legal expert’s view of how the patent should be
construed conflicts with the patent document itself,
such conflict does not create a question of fact nor
can the expert opinion bind the court or relieve the
court of its obligation to construe the claims
according to the tenor of the patent.59
Although stated in the context of a “legal” expert, the above
principle applies to technical experts as well (testifying on the
understanding of a “technician in the field, reading the patent,
would understand the claims”60), because their testimony is
“extrinsic evidence” that may be accepted or rejected, depending
on whether the court finds the evidence “helpful,” without creating
an evidentiary issue that prevents de novo review.61
Having concluded that disputed evidence can be resolved
without any fact finding, the Federal Circuit proceeded to declare
inventor testimony irrelevant, at least testimony on the nature of
the invention. Such testimony “is entitled to no deference,” even if
it describes the understanding of one skilled in the art.62 The
Federal Circuit made this pronouncement after citing—and
quoting—a Supreme Court case crediting “the testimony of one of
the patentees” as the “clearest exposition of the significance which
the terms employed in the claims had for those skilled in the art.”63
The Federal Circuit rejected the testimony by Mr. Markman on the
understanding of one of ordinary skill, and added that, even if the
59

Id. at 983.
Id. at 981.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 983.
63
Id. at 980 (quoting United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S.
228, 233 (1942)).
60
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testimony were true, it would not “dissuade us from our legal
construction of the claim based on the patent and prosecution
history . . . .”64 To ensure no inventor testimony could be credited,
the Federal Circuit added that an inventor’s intent “is of little or no
probative weight in determining the scope of the claim . . . .”65
The Federal Circuit also proclaimed that “extrinsic evidence of
record cannot be relied upon to change the meaning of the
claims.”66 In so doing, Markman presaged the decision in
Phillips,67 which established the specification as the primary
source of claim interpretation, such that extrinsic evidence could
not be used to modify a meaning that was apparent from reviewing
just the patent and its prosecution history.68 Inventor and expert
testimony, previously a central facet of claim interpretation,
immediately became secondary to semantic fencing over the use of
words in the text and prosecution history.69 How and when
extrinsic evidence could be used when the word’s meaning was not
apparent became a crucial focus of claim construction arguments,
with parties arguing over whether the evidence helped understand
the disputed terms, or instead, improperly sought to change a
meaning apparent from the specification.
The Federal Circuit bolstered its Markman opinion by
explaining various propositions that ranged from naive assertions
to outright fantasy. Quoting a treatise from 1890, the Federal
Circuit praised the goal of obtaining “a permanent and universal
64

Id. at 983.
Id. at 985. The Federal Circuit added an exception, saying that the
inventor’s intent “as documented in the prosecution history” was entitled to
weight. Id. The court did not explain why one expression of inventor’s intent
was relevant and another not, but the distinction was presumably based upon the
availability of the prosecution history to the public.
66
Id. at 983. This contention is despite the later declaration that “[t]here is
no parole evidence rule in patent law for obvious reasons.” Id. at 985.
67
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546
U.S. 1170 (2006).
68
Id. at 1311–24.
69
Before Markman, “semantic antics” were roundly condemned by the
Federal Circuit. E.g., Senmed, Inc. v. Richard–Allan Med. Indus., Inc., 888 F.2d
815, 819 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849
F.2d 1418, 1421–22 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
65
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definition of [the inventor’s] rights under the patent.”70 While a
laudable goal, no experienced practitioner would ever expect any
claim interpretation in a lawsuit to have “universal” application,
because each new infringer has different products that produce
different claim construction issues, and a claim construction is only
“permanent” if adopted by all subsequent courts. Nevertheless, the
desire for “permanent and universal” constructions inspired the
Federal Circuit’s relentless cleaving to de novo review. Similarly,
the Federal Circuit reiterated the view that the prosecution history
represented an “undisputed public record,”71 despite occasional
disputes in patent cases regarding what happened during an
examiner interview.
Perhaps most astonishing was the remarkable assertion that
“there should be no ‘ambiguity’ in claim language to one of
ordinary skill in the art that would require resort to evidence
outside the specification and prosecution history.”72 According to
the Federal Circuit, compliance with the “particularly pointing out
and distinctly claiming” requirement of § 112 of the patent
statute73 precludes ambiguity: “[i]f the patent’s claims are
sufficiently unambiguous for the PTO, there should exist no factual
ambiguity when those same claims are later construed by a court of
law in an infringement action.”74 This extraordinary declaration
thus means, according to the Federal Circuit, that extrinsic
evidence cannot be used “for the purpose of clarifying ambiguity
in claim terminology.” Twenty years later, precisely that kind of
ambiguity caused the Supreme Court to overturn Markman’s de
novo review standard.75 Until then, courts and litigants struggled
with how to explain obvious ambiguities in claim language that the
70

Id. at 979 (quoting WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR
USEFUL INVENTIONS § 733, at 483–84 (1890)).
71
Id. at 980. That view did not originate with Markman, but has long been
part of patent lore. See, e.g., Senmed, 888 F.2d at 819 n.8.
72
Markman v. Westview Instruments, 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
73
35 U.S.C. § 112 (West 2014).
74
Markman, 52 F.3d at 986.
75
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 836 (2015). The
phrase “molecular weight” has three meanings: “peak average molecular
weight,” “number average molecular weight,” and “weight average molecular
weight”.
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Federal Circuit said should not exist.
B. The Markman Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Markman provided a
striking counterpoint to the reasoning of the majority. Although
Judge Mayer’s concurrence agreed with the ultimate outcome76
and Judge Newman’s dissent did not,77 they both excoriated the
majority for its reliance on the fact–law distinction to remove
juries from claim construction and for adopting the de novo review
standard. In so doing, they identified the issues that would
dominate Markman proceedings over the ensuing two decades.
Judge Newman was particularly instructive. Although her opinions
have been unjustly dismissed as misguided reveries, her dissent in
Markman, along with Judge Mayer’s concurrence, provided a
concise roadmap of the Federal Circuit struggles to come.
The issues raised by Judges Mayer and Newman were legion:
Factual issues exist regarding the prior art,78 and the “meaning . . .
of an event during prosecution.”79 In resolving disputes over terms,
“the trier of fact often makes findings that depend on the weight,
credibility, and probative value of conflicting evidence . . . .”80
And “the meaning and scope of disputed technologic and other
terms or art in particular usage are classical questions of fact.”81 A
court of appeals is not a trial court, because “[a]ppellate briefs and
fifteen minutes per side of attorney argument are not designed for
de novo findings of disputed technologic questions.”82 While claim
interpretation is ultimately a question of law, underlying factual

76

Markman, 52 F.3d at 998–99 (Mayer, J., concurring).
Id. at 1026 (Newman, J., dissenting). Judge Newman would have
remanded to the district court to apply the substantial evidence standard to
review of the jury verdict. Id.
78
Id. at 991 (Mayer, J., concurring).
79
Id. at 991 (Mayer, J., concurring), 1004 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing
Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 882 (Fed. Cir.
1988)).
80
Id. at 999 (Newman, J., dissenting).
81
Id.
82
Id.
77
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issues still exist.83 And most significantly, “[w]hen the extrinsic
evidence is in conflict—as it invariably is—what then? Will the
Federal Circuit itself weigh the evidence of expert witnesses?”84
Each of these, and more, became the stuff of endless argument
following Markman.
Judges Mayer and Newman also anticipated the Markman
hearing, a procedure without any counterpart in the rest of
jurisprudence: “The majority’s elimination of . . . the deference
owed to the judge . . . distorts the trial/appellate relationship in a
manner unique to patent litigation . . . .”85 As Judge Mayer
declared, Markman “represents a secession from the mainstream of
law.”86 Nowhere else would parties fight for months over the
eventual jury instructions, sometimes with evidentiary hearings,
sometimes with expert reports, sometimes with depositions and
other discovery. Markman transformed patent litigators into hyper
specialists, devoting astonishing efforts to quibbles over both
common and uncommon words, following ever-changing
procedures in pursuit of the ever-elusive predictability and
certainty.
C. The Supreme Court Affirmance
After the sturm und drang at the Federal Circuit, the Supreme
Court’s review was anticlimactic. In a short, unanimous opinion,
the Supreme Court ruled that “the construction of a patent,
including terms of art within its claims, is exclusively within the
province of the court.”87 The Court side-stepped the fact–law issue.
It concluded that the evidence was insufficient to show a practice
analogous to claim interpretation was accomplished by juries
before the adoption of the Constitution.88 It found no binding
Supreme Court precedent requiring construction of patent claims

83

Id. at 1000–02.
Id. at 1006, 1008.
85
Id. at 1008.
86
Id. at 989 (Mayer, J., concurring).
87
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
88
Id. at 377–83.
84
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by juries, and then decided the case on policy grounds.89 Judges
were better suited to the task of claim interpretation and were more
likely to benefit the public by providing “uniformity in the
treatment of a given patent.”90 The issue of de novo review was
ignored, as were the Federal Circuit’s contortions of claim
construction practice to preserve that review. Juries were out,
judges would henceforth evaluate the meaning of claims, and the
patent world embarked on a new, and uncertain, whirlwind of
evolving semantic struggles.
III. THE EARLY FALL-OUT FROM MARKMAN
Like all dramatic changes in the law, Markman produced
immediate questions about what to do and how to do it. Judges
must construe the claims and instruct the jury on their meaning,
that much was clear. But when? How? What evidence, if any,
should be considered? What procedural rules should be followed?
District courts and litigants struggled to answer these and many
similar issues. And they learned, to their dismay, that despite their
best efforts, the de novo review by the Federal Circuit rendered
their decisions irrelevant and the ultimate outcome less predictable.
Two immediate issues were faced: when should the district court
construe the claims and what evidence should the court review?
A. Hearings and When to Hold Them
After Markman, district courts had to decide the procedures for
construing claims. No precedent existed, so district courts had to
create the rules from scratch, adopting new procedures as they
gained experience.91 Even fundamental questions such as whether
the claims should be construed after a hearing or simply on written
briefs had never been answered. District courts thus tried every
89

Id. at 384–90.
Id. at 390.
91
District courts were quick to note that Markman “provided no procedural
guidance for the nature of proceedings for a pretrial construction of claims.”
Chad Indus., Inc. v. Automation Tooling Sys., Inc., 938 F. Supp. 601, 603 (C.D.
Cal. 1996).
90
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approach, and early Markman proceedings ranged from long
evidentiary hearings, to attorney arguments, to written
submissions.
The most significant question soon became when to hold the
hearings. Under Markman’s limited guidance, the claims could be
construed any time before the jury began its deliberations: before
discovery, during discovery but before expert reports, after expert
reports, while deciding a summary judgment motion, at the pretrial conference, or during or even after trial.92 Defendants, often
convinced that the case would disappear as soon as the claims were
construed, sought claim construction at the earliest opportunity.
Defendants saw no reason to engage in discovery and motion
practice when, in their view, a simple determination of claim
meaning would demonstrate non-infringement. But early Markman
proceedings carry risks for judges, who care more for judicial
efficiency than the preferences of litigants. Judges soon realized
that early decisions carried a “whack-a-mole” risk,93 where
resolution of the early claim construction issues led to other claim
construction issues as the case became more refined.
Claim construction proceedings held early usually occurred
before the expert opinions were formed, which sometimes
deprived the court of expert assistance in claim construction. And
judges found that they were more comfortable with the case and its
technology at later stages of the case, when the overall
infringement and validity issues were refined. Judges experimented
with claim construction at a variety of different times, and even
today, the timing of Markman hearings varies widely from district
to district and from judge to judge within each district.94 The
92

E.g., Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Libby–Owens–Ford Co., 894 F. Supp.
844, 850 (D. Del. 1995). Construction after trial has the advantage of providing
the judge all possible evidence, but posed its own problems, due to the delay
required to construe the claims. See Lucas Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison Indus.
L.P., 890 F. Supp. 329, 332 n.3 (D. Del. 1995).
93
“[O]nce you do claim construction, people start coming up with new
theories and new approaches.” Delaware Bar Foundation, Patent Litigation in
the District of Delaware: The Judge’s Perspective, 18 DEL. LAWYER 6, 7–8
(2000) (comments by McKelvie, J.).
94
E.g., id. (District of Delaware judges discussing their options for conduct
of a Markman hearing).
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adoption of local patent rules, starting with the Northern District of
California, provided some uniformity within districts by putting
normal claim construction after mandatory disclosure of
infringement and validity contentions, but great variety still exists
between districts, and judges are free, even in districts with local
rules, to schedule the Markman hearing as late in the process as
they desire. That variation encourages forum shopping as plaintiffs
seek the most advantageous timing (usually later in the case), and
the variety created great cost uncertainty, especially for defendants.
B. What Can the Court Review?
The problem of when to conduct Markman hearings pales in
comparison to the issues surrounding what evidence the district
court can consider. The Federal Circuit’s guidance was less than
Delphic, and the Supreme Court did nothing to resolve the
uncertainty. Compounding the problem, the Federal Circuit’s
proposition that no credibility determinations result from
reviewing competing expert testimony produced immediate
consternation among the judiciary.95 Expert testimony could be
taken, and indeed, seemed necessary to understand some patents,
but its proper weight was obscure. Use of non-patent documents to
aid the process was equally uncertain. How was the prior art to be
used, if at all? Were dictionaries, which were “extrinsic” to the
patent and prosecution history, now to be disregarded, or merely
given less weight? Should a technical treatise or a technical article
be considered, and if so for what purpose? And if consulted, how
much weight should be given? The inventor’s testimony was of
little or no weight, according to Markman, but did that also apply
to admissions by the inventor? In the world created by Markman,
where incomprehensible patents nevertheless had “no ambiguity”
and the extrinsic evidence “cannot be relied upon to change the
meaning of the claims,” discerning the understanding of a person
skilled in the art became a daunting prospect.
95

E.g., Lucas Aerospace, 890 F. Supp. at 333 n.7 (Schwartz, J.) (“But when
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals states that the trial court does not do
something that the trial court does and must do to perform the judicial function,
that court knowingly enters a land of sophistry and fiction.”).
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The Federal Circuit attempted to resolve these issues a year
after Markman in Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.96 Rather
than clarifying the process, Vitronics created a mythical world that
compounded the uncertainty. Intended to clarify the step-by-step
process courts should use to construe claims, Vitronics instead
presented district courts with a nearly insurmountable task: they
must understand and construe eccentric jargon describing esoteric
technology, while using experts to help them understand that
technology but not the patent’s claims.
Vitronics began by establishing a hierarchy. Patents are
construed by first looking only at the intrinsic evidence. The
process begins by looking at the word of the claims,97 which are to
be given their “ordinary and customary meaning.”98 The
specification is then reviewed, followed by the prosecution
history.99 Then the Federal Circuit indulged in a fantasy. “In most
situations, an analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will resolve
any ambiguity in a disputed claim term.”100 Perhaps this approach
makes sense for patents involving simple technology, but the idea
is absurd for much of the modern technology described in patents.
One can rarely say that “disputed” terms have no ambiguity to a
judge when those terms are used in patents involving complex
chemistry, semiconductors, software, or any of a host of subtly
complex subjects. Vitronics nevertheless declared such clarity the
norm and proceeded to narrowly proscribe use of experts to
explain the disputed terms, except in rare circumstances.101
Assuredly, experts could be consulted.102 But such extrinsic
evidence generally, and experts in particular, could normally be
96

90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1582.
98
Id. Vitronics made no attempt to explain how the court was to divine the
“ordinary and customary” meaning of technical terms that are outside the court’s
normal understanding.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 1583.
101
The goal was to provide public notice so that competitors could “review
the public record, apply the established rules of claim construction, ascertain the
scope of the patentees claimed invention and, thus, design around the claimed
invention.” Id.
102
Id. at 1584.
97
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consulted to only “help the court come to the proper understanding
of the claims”—it could not be used “to vary or contradict the
claim language.”103 How the judge was to know that the expert,
describing medicinal chemistry, was contradicting the claim
language was never described. Instead, the district courts were left
to perform metaphysical gymnastics: they could let the expert
explain the technology of the patent but not the words used in the
patent to describe the technology.104 Experts could not be used to
“vary claim terms” even from how they were “implicitly” defined
in the specification.105
Vitronics did provide some clarity. It explained that prior art
could be considered as well as dictionaries.106 The importance of
the specification was emphasized.107 Inventor testimony on claim
meaning was again condemned.108 And the sequence of analysis
was clearly identified. Yet the process was impossible for any
technology unfamiliar to the judge, and the result was growing
confusion.
IV. DE NOVO REVIEW REVISITED
Markman ruled that a district court’s claim construction
decision would be reviewed de novo on appeal, based upon the
contention that claim construction involved no fact issues. The
Supreme Court avoided directly addressing the question, which
appeared to leave the de novo review standard intact. Yet the
Supreme Court’s decision hinted that claim interpretation was a
mixed question of law and fact,109 thereby producing decisions by
103

Id.
Judge Rader subsequently commented that “[a]s a matter of logic, this
instruction is difficult to grasp.” Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448,
1474 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J., dissenting).
105
Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583–84.
106
Id. at 1584.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
The Supreme Court in Markman hinted that claim construction was a
“mongrel practice,” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378
(1996), and that it fell “somewhere between a pristine legal standard and simple
historical fact,” id. at 388.
104
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various Federal Circuit panels applying the “clearly erroneous”
standard to factual aspects of claim interpretation.110 The issue then
was addressed in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc.,111 two years after
Vitronics, and three years after Markman.
A. Cybor
Demonstrating the sharp division that would characterize
Federal Circuit attempts to grapple with the Markman–Vitronics
process, Cybor produced six opinions: an opinion by the majority
joined by eight judges; separate concurring opinions by Judges
Plager, Bryson, and Chief Judge Mayer; a dissent by Judge Rader;
and additional views by Judge Newman.112 The Cybor majority reaffirmed the de novo review standard, locking into place the
foundation for much future angst. Rejecting the suggestion that the
Supreme Court’s Markman decision supports claim construction as
a legal issue with some underlying factual determinations,113 the
Cybor majority resolutely declared that “nothing” from the
Supreme Court’s decision supports the view “that claim
construction may involve subsidiary or underlying questions of
fact.”114 Compounding the difficulty, Cybor rejected the
suggestion that “there should be deference to what are asserted to
be factual underpinnings of claim construction,”115 a conclusion
that was immediately undermined by Judge Plager’s view that
“common sense dictates that the trial judge’s view will carry

110

E.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d
1547, 1555–56 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Wiener v. NEC Elecs. Inc., 102 F.3d 534, 539
(Fed. Cir. 1996); Metaulics Sys. Co. v. Cooper, 100 F.3d 938, 939 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
111
138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
112
Id.
113
Id. at 1455.
114
Id. Ignoring entirely the concept of judicial restraint, the majority
declared that the Supreme Court must have concluded that no factual issues arise
in claim construction, else “surely the Supreme Court would have discussed
whether subsidiary or underlying fact questions should be decided by the judge
or the jury.” Id. at 1455 n.5.
115
Id. at 1455–56.
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weight.”116 Judge Bryson compounded the uncertainties by
declaring that, when “claim construction would turn on an issue
such as a credibility judgment between two competing expert
witnesses,”117 de novo review still allows the appellate court “to
factor into our legal analysis the district court’s superior access to
one of the pertinent tools.”118 The battle lines were now drawn for
a long struggle that would continue for the next seventeen years.
Cybor also presaged the difficulties in finding “ordinary and
customary” meaning in common terms, since Cybor raised a
significant dispute over the meaning of the word “to,”119 and the
phrase “or both.”120 When simple, not technical terms such as “to”
and “or both” are the focus of district court and appellate
argument, the entire concept of “plain meaning” or “ordinary
meaning” becomes suspect. Yet that concept remains a bedrock of
claim construction law, adding great uncertainty to how disputes
over such terms will eventually be resolved.
The Cybor majority was excoriated in Chief Judge Mayer’s
concurrence, Judge Rader’s dissent, and Judge Newman’s
additional views. Each focused on the difficulty of applying the de
novo review standard under the Markman process. Chief Judge
Mayer declared that the majority’s adherence to de novo review
“profoundly misapprehends” the Supreme Court’s Markman
decision.121 Judge Rader criticized the lack of deference to the trial
“main event”122 and lamented the Federal Circuit’s inability to
reconcile the denigration of expert testimony with the principle
that claim meaning is viewed in the eyes of one of ordinary skill in
the art with: “What then defeats the relevance of the testimony of
one of skill in that art at the time of the invention?”123 He noted the
high reversal rate appearing in Federal Circuit cases and declared
that the Markman process “provides no early certainty at all, but
116

Id. at 1462 (Plager, J., concurring).
Id. at 1463 (Bryson, J., concurring).
118
Id.
119
Id. at 1458–59. “To” was also discussed in Chief Judge Mayer’s
concurring opinion. Id. at 1469, 1472.
120
Id. at 1469, 1472 (Mayer, C.J., concurring).
121
Id. at 1463.
122
Id. at 1473.
123
Id. at 1475.
117
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only opens the bidding.”124 Judge Newman agreed, noting the
objective of “greater stability” thereby “enhancing consistency”
“had not been well achieved.”125 She described the resulting
“unpredictability”126 of Markman, and how the Federal Circuit
process will “confound rather than ease the litigation process.”127
All of these comments would be repeated over the decades, as the
Federal Circuit continued to cling to de novo review in the face of
ever increasing criticism.
The issues of de novo review and deference to the district court
would continue to dog the Federal Circuit, and the issue is alive
even now. Those issues were debated but not resolved in
Phillips,128 the 2005 decision that has dominated claim
construction for the last decade. De novo review remained the law
after Phillips, despite even more strident criticism.129 They were
again the focus in 2014, when the Federal Circuit decided Lighting
Ballast,130 and again reaffirmed de novo review.131 Only in 2015
124

Id. at 1476.
Id. at 1478 (Newman, J., additional views).
126
Id. at 1479.
127
Id. at 1480.
128
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Federal
Circuit invited amicus briefs on a number of claim construction issues, including
whether “[it is] appropriate for this court to accord any deference to any aspect
of trial court claim construction rulings.” Id. at 1328. The Federal Circuit
majority opinion did not debate the question but instead merely embraced
Vitronics. Id.
129
Chief Judge Mayer’s criticism of the majority was scathing. He referred
to the “absurdity” of “adhering to the falsehood that claim construction is devoid
of any factual component.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1330. He described the result of
the Federal Circuit’s standard as “mayhem” that “seriously undermined the
legitimacy of the process, if not the integrity of the institution.” Id. He described
the Federal Circuit’s claim construction decisions as a “black hole,” id., and said
“the court flails about in an attempt to solve the claim construction
‘conundrum.’” Id. at 1334. His conclusion was disdainful: “The court’s opinion
today is akin to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic—the orchestra is
playing as if nothing is amiss, but the ship is still heading for Davey Jones’
locker.” Id. at 1334–35.
130
Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elec. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d
1272, 1282–84 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (reaffirming the de novo review standard, this
time on the basis of stare decisis so that “settled expectations” should not be
disrupted).
125
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did the Supreme Court finally correct the Federal Circuit and direct
what should have been plain all along: claim construction has
factual components that must be reviewed under Rule 52’s “clear
error” standard.132 In the meantime, much damage was done, and
the Federal Circuit suffered continuing disdain for its stubborn
assertion of the impossible.
B. The Reversal Rate: Growing Criticism
Markman was decided in the hope that claim construction
conducted solely by judges would make patent law more certain
and predictable. Alas, that was not to be, as the reversal rates by
the Federal Circuit began to demonstrate.133 Criticism of the
Federal Circuit’s rate of reversal became a continuing feature of
the Federal Circuit’s Markman jurisprudence.134 The criticism,
from judges, practitioners, and scholars, attacked Federal Circuit
jurisprudence as confusing and often attributed that confusion to
the de novo review standard. Thus, for example, the National Law
Journal describes the reversal rate of claim construction as having
“so enraged the bench that one federal judge—Samuel Kent of
Galveston, Texas—has dismissed the appeals court as ‘little green
men wearing propeller hats who don’t know Tuesday from
Philadelphia.’”135
A careful study of the reversal rate on claim construction136
revealed that reversal was indeed a problem, despite occasional
131

Id.
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 833 (2015).
133
As early as 1998, Judge Rader noted in Cybor that fifty-three percent of
patent cases were reversed by the Federal Circuit, in whole or in part. Cybor
Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 (Rader, J., dissenting).
134
See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim
Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 245–46
(2005). The author, who would eventually be appointed to the Federal Circuit,
concluded that Markman created confusion and the reversal rate was getting
worse.
135
Victoria Slind-Flor, Formerly Obscure Court is in Spotlight: Importance
of New Technology Makes Its Decisions Big News, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 30, 2001 at
B9, B12.
136
Moore, supra note 134.
132
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denials by Federal Circuit judges. Conducted by Professor Moore
(later Federal Circuit Judge Moore), the study concluded that the
claim construction reversal rate in appeals from 1996 through 2003
was 34.5%.137 Professor Moore further concluded that, after
declining from 1996 through 1998 to 20%, the reversal rate
increased to nearly 40% by 2003.138 From this, Professor Moore
blamed de novo review for at least part of the increase, and
concluded that “district court judges are not able to resolve claim
construction issues as the Federal Circuit judges would like.”139
Others reached similar conclusions.140
Professor Moore also concluded that the Federal Circuit “is not
providing sufficient guidance on claim construction,”141 a view
that echoed the more vigorous criticism from the bar and other
scholars. Thus, for example, the Chair of the ABA Section of
Intellectual Property Law criticized the Federal Circuit’s “morass
of confused and contradictory claim construction canons.”142 A
practitioner stated “what is certain is that uncertainty reigns
supreme in trying to prognosticate how the CAFC will resolve”
issues.143 Another commented that “[i]t comes as little surprise that
some trial judges have grown apathetic to the process, and that
nearly all litigants unhappy with the outcome of their cases will
137

Id. at 233.
Id. at 246.
139
Id.
140
E.g., Michael A. O’Shea, A Changing Role for the Markman Hearing:
In Light of Festo IX, Markman Hearings Could Become M-F-G Hearings Which
are Longer, More Complex and Ripe for Appeal, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 843
(2004); Victoria Slind-Flor, Markman Precedent Holds Up Patents: Ruling
Intended to Add Predictability and Speed Fails to Do So, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 15,
2001 at A1, A12.
141
Moore, supra note 139, at 247.
142
Mark T. Banner, Keeping Current with the Chair, 21 ABA SEC. OF
INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW NEWSLETTER, no. 4, Summer 2003, at 14, available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/ipl_newsletter/intelpro
p_bulletin_summer_03.authcheckdam.pdf.
143
George J. Awad & George A. Frank, Federal Circuit Construction
Project: Hard Hats Required, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 25, 2004, at 5,
available
at
http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id=900005413766/FedCircuit-Construction-Project-Hard-Hats-Required?slreturn=20150329080006.
138
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appeal and include a claim construction issue.”144 Still another
criticized Federal Circuit “hyperactivity,” and argued that the
Federal Circuit was engaged in “appellate fact finding.”145
Something had definitively gone amiss in the Federal Circuit’s
plan to produce greater predictability and clarity.
V. NEVER-ENDING PROBLEMS
The problem of de novo review dominated issues after
Markman, but it was by no means the only issue to arise. When
claim construction was removed from the jury’s black box and
subjected to scrutiny in the harsh light of written judicial opinions,
the carefully constructed procedure of Markman, Vitronics, Cybor,
and Phillips displayed numerous intractable flaws. Some flaws
were a necessary result from Markman, while others followed from
the inability of the Federal Circuit to articulate coherent or
practical claim construction rules. Some were eventually resolved
by the Federal Circuit, and some remain even today.
A. Whack-a-Mole: The Unforeseen Problem of Iterative Processes
A little understood aspect of Markman produced a crucial but
rarely recognized problem. Claim construction is inherently an
iterative process, involving not just the intrinsic and extrinsic
evidence but complex interactions between the plaintiff’s theory of
infringement and the defendant’s theory of invalidity. Defendants
select their prior art based in part on their objective view of the
patent’s proper scope, but also based upon the scope of the patent
implied by the plaintiff’s infringement contentions; broader
contentions capture more prior art, and the canons of claim
construction declare that the prior art helps inform the meaning of
144

Anthony R. Zeuli & Rachel Clark Hugley, Avoiding Patent Claim
Construction Errors: Determining the Ordinary and Customary Meaning Before
Reading the Written Description, FED. LAWYER, June 2004, at 29–30, available
at http://www.merchantgould.com/portalresource/1262.pdf.
145
William C. Rooklidge & Mathew F. Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity: The
Federal Circuit’s Discomfort with Its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
725, 729–30 (2000).
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the claim terms.146 The natural result is that a change in the
plaintiff’s infringement theory (and accordingly the plaintiff’s
claim construction theory) produces a change in the defendant’s
claim construction arguments. Similarly, when the defendant
identifies prior art, the plaintiff inevitably seeks to modify its claim
construction to avoid the prior art but still cover the accused
product. Plaintiffs and defendants both frequently fail to fully
understand how their opponent is truly characterizing claim terms
until the process has progressed, and often not until after extensive
briefing. The result is a series of iterations, with the parties
repeatedly jostling as their opponent’s assertions are clarified and
modified. This iterative process is integrally part of claim
interpretation.
The problem becomes more acute when, as is usually the case,
the district court construes the terms by accepting part of each
side’s argument. The parties then scramble to adjust their
contentions. The defendant searches for new art covered by the
unforeseen interpretation of the court, setting off a counter
argument by the plaintiff, who looks to change other aspects of the
claim interpretation to make the new construction consistent with
the plaintiff’s infringement theory. When extrinsic evidence is
involved (as is frequently the case), the parties need to revisit their
extrinsic discovery. This is the “whack-a-mole” problem, first
described by Judge McKelvie of the District of Delaware, 147 and
later detailed by Judge Rader in his Cybor dissent.148 Worse,
district judges sometimes do not recognize the implications of their
construction until they hear trial arguments and testimony, at
which point they might need to change the construction mid-trial,
146

1996).

147

Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed. Cir.

Delaware Bar Foundation, supra note 93.
“As soon as the trial court issues a claim interpretation, both sides often
seek to shift their original claim interpretations to accommodate the judge’s
views. Thus, the parties seek to revise expert reports or reopen discovery to
account for the Judge’s interpretation. . . . As a result of the new and perhaps
somewhat unexpected interpretation, the parties scramble to create and acquire
new evidence for their infringement arguments.” Cybor Corp. v. FAS
Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1474 n.2.
148
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with potentially unfortunate consequences.149
The problem did not exist before Markman. When juries
construed the claims as part of their infringement analysis, they did
so in a single proceeding (the trial). Each side presented a coherent
theory. The plaintiff described how their theory of infringement,
including their theory of how the claim terms were interpreted,
both demonstrated infringement and preserved the patent’s
validity. Defendants likewise presented an internally consistent
theory explaining how the correct interpretation of the patent
showed either non-infringement or invalidity (or perhaps both).
Some iterations occurred during the give-and-take at trial, but all
interwoven issues were hashed out in the all-encompassing
discussions in the jury room, which led to a decision that one side
was right and the other wrong.
Temporally distancing the first step of the infringement
analysis (claim interpretation) from both the second step
(comparison of the claims to the accused product) and the validity
analysis necessarily produced an overwhelming demand for further
iterations. Markman led to endless battles that consisted of
attempts by the plaintiff to maintain infringement theory flexibility
throughout the process and matching attempts by the defendant to
lock the plaintiff into an early and unchanging construction.
Plaintiffs similarly sought to prevent any shifts of the defendant’s
invalidity theories, especially after the trial court construed the
claims. Some local rules accommodated this jostling, but some did
not, and in districts without local rules, the judge allowed, or
disallowed, modifications as she saw fit.
No refinement of the Markman process can eliminate this
problem. As long as claim construction occurs before the jury is
presented with the trial evidence, parties will seek to modify the
construction wherever they see an advantage. The result will
continue to be a disagreeable sausage-making process, with at least
occasional unfairness for one side or the other.

149

Id.
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B. Semantic Antics: The Issues Become Surreal
Although well-intentioned, the Federal Circuit’s efforts to
delineate rational and consistent claim construction rules led to
perplexing contortions and, occasionally, bewildering results.
Underlying the difficulty was the Federal Circuit’s desire for an
almost algorithmic process, where the same input (a patent claim)
would produce the same result (a correct claim construction)
regardless of who applied the algorithm.150 Since a consistently
applied algorithm is impossible, the Federal Circuit decisions
repeatedly disappointed. This a natural result of the Federal
Circuit’s concentration on the meaning of words, which contrasts
sharply with the pre-Federal Circuit approach to claim
construction. That approach focused not on word interpretation,
but on a determination of what the inventor actually invented.151
The latter approach tacitly recognized that the same invention
could be described by different words, but justice would be served
by confining the patent to the actual invention, however described.
This approach was rejected by the Federal Circuit, which was
enthralled in its quest for the Holy Grail of predictability. The
Federal Circuit was forced to grapple with endless semantic
quibbles that as often as not obscured rather than clarified.
1. Dictionaries
If claim construction involves determining the meaning of the
words used in the patent claim, then a natural resource to aid that
process is a dictionary, technical or otherwise. Though this
position is manifestly logical, the Federal Circuit still struggled to
determine when—or even if—dictionaries could be used to help
150

The Federal Circuit disavowed the existence of any algorithm in
Phillips, saying that “there is no magic formula or catechism” and that it “did
not attempt to provide a rigid algorithm for claim construction . . . .” Phillips v.
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Yet the Federal Circuit’s
goal of predictability and certainty has no other implication.
151
E.g., Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1, 14 (1935) (“If the claim were fairly
susceptible of two constructions, that should be adopted which will secure to the
patentee his actual invention.” (emphasis added)).
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construe the claims. Part of the struggle stemmed from the Federal
Circuit’s reasonable desire to ensure that the patent’s specification
was the primary claim construction tool, but part also flowed from
the Federal Circuit’s unceasing hunger to protect the rationale of
Markman, so that extrinsic evidence (which most specifically
included dictionaries) could not crack the edifice built from the “no
issue of fact” gospel.
Before Markman, dictionaries were a consistent source used in
claim construction issues, including in the regional circuits, in the
C.C.P.A., and in the Federal Circuit.152 The practice continued
after Markman, with the Federal Circuit repeatedly using, and
approving, use of dictionaries.153 Dictionaries, after all, provided a
route to determine the “ordinary and customary” meaning of terms.
Yet dictionaries often provided multiple meanings for words, and
general dictionaries rarely defined words as they were used in
esoteric technologies. Since claim construction had become a
semantic jungle, focused upon ever more subtle distinctions in the
“plain and ordinary” meaning154 of words, several Federal Court
decisions warned of the dangers posed by dictionaries.155 When the
152

Cases from the regional circuits include: Saunders v. Air-Flo Co., 646
F.2d 1201, 1206 (7th Cir. 1981); Dickstein v. Seventy Corp., 522 F.2d 1294,
1297 (6th Cir. 1975); Gen. Tire & Rubber Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
489 F.2d 1105, 1110 (6th Cir. 1973). C.C.P.A. cases include: In re Gaubert, 524
F.2d 1222, 1226 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Skoll, 523 F.2d 1392, 1395–96
(C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Altenpohl, 500 F.2d 1151, 1157 n.7 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
Federal Circuit cases include: Nike, Inc. v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 43 F.3d
644, 647 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 46 F.3d
1556, 1561 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d
948, 951 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
153
E.g., Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed.
Cir. 2002); CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brusnwick Corp., 288 F.3d. 1359, 1366 (Fed.
Cir. 2002); Optical Disc Corp. v. Del Mar Avionics, 208 F.3d 1324, 1334–35
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, PLC, 65 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
154
E.g., GE Lighting Solutions, LLC. v. Agilight, Inc., 750 F.3d
1304,1308–10 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
155
Kinik Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 362 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(holding that dictionaries are inappropriate for common words that might be
used differently in the patent); AFG Indus., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co. 239 F.3d
1239, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that dictionaries should only be used when
the patent fails to define a term); Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 199
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Texas Digital156 case expressed resounding support for dictionary
use,157 the resulting controversy prompted the Federal Circuit to
consider, en banc, just how dictionaries could be used to help
determine the meaning of terms.158 The result was an elaborate
discussion in Phillips, approving particular technical dictionary
uses, approving fewer uses of general dictionaries, slotting
dictionaries into the elaborate claim construction hierarchy of
Vitronics, and limiting the broad language of Texas Digital.159 Yet
the dictionary guidance of Phillips was generalized, giving district
courts ample opportunity to inadvertently misuse dictionaries and
thereby justify yet another ground for reversal in a Federal Circuit
de novo review.
2. Nonsensical Decisions
Achieving a fair and just resolution of legal disputes would
seem a fundamental goal of the courts, even in patent cases. A
priori, admittedly “nonsensical” decisions should be abhorred by
all courts and avoided whenever possible. Yet the Federal Circuit,
driven by a need to follow its Markman and Vitronics dictates, has
ruled that “nonsensical” conclusions must be accepted when the
Court’s claim construction process leads to that end. Thus, the
process is all-important, and deviations cannot be accepted merely
to avoid a nonsensical result.
The leading case adopting this proposition is Chef America,
Inc. v. Lamb–Weston, Inc.,160 which involved making bread. The
claim specified heating the bread dough “to” a temperature of
F.3d 1295, 1299–300 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that general dictionaries are
unsuited to scientific meaning of words); Anderson v. Int’l Eng’g & Mfg., Inc.,
160 F.3d 1345, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that, where dictionaries
provide more than one meaning, the technical meaning must be taken from the
context of the patent).
156
Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
157
Id. at 1202–05.
158
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1319–22 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
159
Id.
160
Chef America, Inc., v. Lamb–Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
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400°F to 850°F.161 Yet if heated to that range, as every bread chef
instinctively knew, the dough “would be burned to a crisp.”162 The
patent owner argued that the claim obviously meant heating the
dough “at” the specified temperature, which was the only logical
interpretation of the claim.163 The district court refused to so
construe the patent, concluding instead that a nonsensical result
was required.164 The Federal Circuit agreed,165 conclusively
demonstrating that the process was more important than reaching a
result that made sense.166
Chef America was not the first decision adopting a
“nonsensical” result. The “nonsensical” doctrine originated five
years earlier, in Process Control Corp. v. Hydreclaim Corp.167
Like Chef America, the Process Control decision approved a
“nonsensical” result, this time reversing a district court that had
refused to do so.168 Process Control, however, involved a
miswritten claim that used the same language for different
processes in the specification.169 The Federal Circuit invalidated
the claim rather than interpreting it to cover the process in the
specification,170 thereby creating the principle applied in Chef
America. While the principle’s application in Process Control was
less unreasonable, the Federal Circuit nevertheless repeatedly
applied it, not only in Chef America but in a series of subsequent
cases.171 Yet those cases stand in sharp contrast to other decisions,
161

Id. at 1371.
Id. at 1373.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 1374–76.
166
The Federal Circuit also refused to accept the conclusion of an expert’s
declaration that the patent’s text should be read “as meaning that the product is
placed in an oven whose temperature has been set in the range of about 400°F to
850°F.” Id. at 1375. The expert explained that “[i]t was well known in 1987, and
still is well known, that raising the temperature of a dough product itself to such
high temperatures would result in an unusable product.” Id. The Federal Circuit
was unmoved.
167
190 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
168
Id. at 1355.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 1359.
171
E.g., Source Vagabond Sys. Ltd. v Hydrapak, Inc., 753 F.3d 1291, 1301
162
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such as AIA Engineering Ltd., where the Federal Circuit declared
that “[w]e strive, where possible, to avoid nonsensical results in
construing claim language.”172 In AIA, the Federal Circuit refused
to give a claim term its ordinary meaning because it would be
nonsensical.173 The rule, then, is that the Federal Circuit will avoid
nonsensical claim constructions, except when nonsensical
constructions will be applied.174
3. “Plain and Ordinary” Meaning
Vitronics held that “words in a claim are generally given their
ordinary and customary meaning,”175 and Phillips explained that
the “ordinary and customary” meaning was “the meaning that the
term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question
. . . .”176 Determining what is “ordinary” or “customary” has not,
however, been a simple task. Phillips described how the “ordinary”
meaning “may be readily apparent even to lay judges,”177 and in
those circumstances “general purpose dictionaries may be helpful.”
178
Yet in many cases, “determining the ordinary and customary
meaning of a claim requires examination of terms that have a
(Fed. Cir. 2014); Braintree Labs., Inc. v. Novel Labs., Inc., 749 F.3d 1349, 1367
(Fed. Cir. 2014); Ortho–McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d
1358, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
172
AIA Eng’g Ltd. v. Magotteaux Int’l S/A, 657 F.3d 1264, 1276 (Fed. Cir.
2011). Accord Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Group, LP, 616
F.3d 1249, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Tex. Sys. v.
BENQ Am. Corp., 533 F.3d 1362, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
173
AIA Eng’g Ltd., 657 F.3d at 1276.
174
The “nonsensical” cases are akin to the decision in Elekta Instr. S.A. v.
O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, 214 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Vitronics had ruled that
claim interpretations that exclude the preferred embodiment are “rarely, if ever
correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support.” 90 F.3d at
1583. Yet in Elekta, the Federal Circuit chose the “ordinary meaning” of the
claims terms to construe the patent to not cover the only embodiment disclosed
in the specification. 214 F.3d at 1307–08.
175
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
176
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
177
Id. at 1314.
178
Id.
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particular meaning in a field of art.”179 And therein lies the rub.
Despite the exhaustive efforts of the Federal Circuit to provide
user-friendly rules for claim construction, litigants repeatedly, and
sometimes sharply, dispute just what is the “ordinary and
customary” meaning of claim terms.
Part of the difficulty arose from the evolution of the doctrine of
“ordinary and customary” meaning into a doctrine of “plain and
ordinary” meaning. “Ordinary” and “customary” are related terms,
with “ordinary” implying that the meaning is common and not
unusual, and “customary” implying that a meaning has some
frequency of use. But “plain” is an entirely different concept,
implying that the word’s meaning can be readily determined from
the mere inspection of the term. Many “ordinary” terms are not at
all “plain.” Yet the Federal Circuit has used both approaches, with
little guidance on when a claim term’s meaning is “plain” rather
than just “ordinary” or “customary.”180 Thus, while the concept of
an “ordinary” meaning predates Markman,181 loose use of
terminology caused the eventual adoption of a “plain and ordinary”
meaning standard, which is in common use today.182 Although the
concepts have different meanings, the Federal Circuit has not
explained when the “plain” meaning is apparent and should be
used, rather than a term’s “ordinary” meaning, leaving district
courts and litigants to follow the loose “dictionary” guidance of
Phillips. Not surprisingly, plaintiffs have cleaved to the “plain”
meaning approach—it allows them to argue any quasi-reasonable
meaning for disputed terms, thereby providing them the flexibility
they so dearly value. The Federal Circuit has criticized mere
179

Id.
The sloppiness may have resulted from a belief that an “ordinary and
customary” meaning does not differ from a “plain and ordinary” meaning. For
example, Northern Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 215 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir.
2000), applied the “plain and ordinary” meaning standard, but cited a case that
actually described the “ordinary and customary” standard. Id. at 1291 (citing
Johnson Worldwide Assoc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 990 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
181
E.g., Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
182
E.g., Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 774 F.3d 1349, 1353 (2014). The
shift in terminology appears in National Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic
Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
180
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adoption of “plain meaning”183 without explaining that meaning,
so litigators, especially plaintiffs, continue to propose deciding that
a term has a “plain meaning” that needs no further construction.
4. It Depends on the Meaning of “Or”
No demonstration of the impossibility of a predictable claim
construction process, especially for terms that should have a “plain
meaning,” is more vivid than in the two cases where the Federal
Circuit was unable to agree on the meaning of the word “or.”184 In
both cases, infringement turned on whether “or” should be
interpreted exclusively (i.e., “A or B” but not “A and B”) or nonexclusively (“A or B” or “A and B”). In both cases, the majority
ruled in favor of the exclusive “or,” saying it was the “plain
reading” of the claim185 or “quite clear” from the patent
documents.186 The dissent contended that “or” should be construed
non-exclusively, saying that was the “practical common-sense
way” of writing the claim,187 and that the “plain meaning” of “or”
could be either construction.188 The Markman–Vitronics process
cannot produce predictable results when the patent experts at the
Federal Circuit, in attempting to follow that process, cannot agree
on the meaning of even the most commonly used and simplest of
English terms. The “or” cases show the fallacy of attempts to rely
on either “plain” or “ordinary” meaning as interpreted by judicial
experts.
A similar conclusion can be drawn from the somewhat less
striking Federal Circuit decisions contesting the meaning of “on,”

183

O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351,
1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“A determination that a claim term ‘needs no
construction’ or has the ‘plain and ordinary meaning’ may be inadequate when a
term has more than one ‘ordinary’ meaning or when reliance on a term’s
‘ordinary’ meaning does not resolve the parties’ dispute.”).
184
Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Kustom Signals, Inc. v.
Applied Concepts, Inc., 264 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
185
Brown, 265 F.3d at 1352.
186
Kustom, 264 F.3d at 1331.
187
Brown, 265 F.3d at 1354.
188
Kustom, 264 F.3d at 1333.
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Senmed, Inc. v. Richard–Allan Medical Indus., Inc.189 and
Inverness Medical Switzerland GmbH v. Warner Lambert Co.190
The Federal Circuit struggled with that simple term both before
and after Markman. In Senmed, the issue was whether “on”
required physical touching.191 The majority ruled that it did,192 and
the dissent argued that it need not.193 In Inverness, the issue was
whether “on” meant “on top of” a “test strip,” or whether “on”
could include being interior to the strip, such that it was “on” just a
portion of the strip.194 The district court ruled that “on” meant on
top of,195 but the Federal Circuit reversed, ruling that the “plain
meaning” of “on” included “within.”196 Again, these cases
demonstrate that a term’s “plain meaning” can be anything but
plain, and is usually dependent on the eye of the beholder.
VI. OTHER ISSUES
Much of consequence resulted from Markman that cannot be
attributed to the Federal Circuit’s quixotic devotion to de novo
review. And while the most significant cases produced
consternation, confusion, and even conflict, other significant
changes occurred, some for the good and others less so.
A. Phillips
The 2005 decision in Phillips addressed a host of topics in an
attempt to resolve disputes within the Federal Circuit and address
the growing criticism of the Markman–Vitronics regimen.197 While
189

888 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
309 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
191
Senmed, 888 F.2d at 821.
192
Id.
193
Id. at 824.
194
Inverness Med. Switz., 309 F.3d at 1377–78.
195
Id. at 1378.
196
Id. at 1382.
197
The Federal Circuit reheard the case en banc “to resolve issues
concerning the construction of patent claims” that the original panel had raised.
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Seven claim
construction topics were selected for resolution. Id. at 1383.
190

2015]

MARKMAN TWENTY YEARS LATER:
TWENTY YEARS OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

293

Phillips was criticized for failing to resolve the question of
deference to the trial court rulings, it did clarify some unresolved
issues. Its extensive discussion of dictionaries firmly established
that dictionaries could be consulted,198 and it expressed a
preference for technical over general dictionaries.199 If the
remainder of Phillips’s discussion of dictionaries was less than
fully edifying, the decision nevertheless eliminated one uncertainty
for district courts and litigants. Phillips also reaffirmed that
“claims should be so construed, if possible, to sustain their
validity,”200 but did not endorse “a regime in which validity
analysis is a regular component of claim construction.”201 Instead,
preserving validity should be considered when the claim is still
ambiguous “after applying all the available tools of claim
construction.”202
Phillips also confirmed that some of the basic principles of
Vitronics would not be disturbed, thereby ending some of the
clamor for revision. The primacy of the specification was
cemented into claim construction law, with Phillips declaring that
courts can “rely heavily on the written description for guidance as
to the meaning of the claims.”203 Expert testimony was again
endorsed, but again for a difficult-to-follow role: “to ensure that
the court’s understanding of the technical aspects of the patent is
consistent with that of a person of skill in the art, or to establish
that a particular term in the patent or the prior art has a particular
meaning in the pertinent field.”204 The door was therefore open for
extensive use of experts, but not for “conclusory, unsupported
assertions.”205 Instead, Phillips concluded that “a court should
discount any expert testimony ‘that is clearly at odds with the
claim construction mandated by the claims themselves, the written
description, and the prosecution history . . . .’”206 This process
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206

Id. at 1317–21.
Id. at 1321.
Id. at 1327.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1317.
Id. at 1318.
Id.
Id. (quoting Key Pharm. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed.
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essentially gave district courts license to listen to any and all expert
testimony, as long as their claim construction opinion properly
focused on the specification and prosecution history and did not
improperly credit experts.
Recognizing reality, Phillips conceded that “there is no magic
formula or catechism for conducting claim construction.”207 That
recognition relieved district courts of the concern that a reversal
would result merely from following the wrong sequence of steps or
holding the wrong kind of hearing. Moreover, Phillips underscored
the “cardinal sin” of patent law, “reading a limitation from the
written description into the claims,”208 again emphasizing the
primacy of the “ordinary and customary meanings attributed to the
words themselves.”209 The natural tension between reading a
limitation from the specification into the claims and paying
primary attention to the context of terms in the specification was,
sadly, not resolved. Despite the remaining uncertainties, Phillips
provided sufficient guidance that it became the bedrock of all
subsequent claim interpretation cases; it provided enough clarity
for judges and litigants to become comfortable with the resulting
process, even while the ultimate outcome of claim construction
remained unpredictable.
B. Preferring Narrow Interpretations
An important claim construction doctrine developed separate
from the Vitronics–Phillips line of cases, one that evidenced a
distinctly pro-defendant bias. In Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v.
Prince Mfg., Inc.,210 the Federal Circuit announced a preference for
narrow, rather than broad claim constructions.211 Athletic
Alternatives addressed a circumstance where an “equal choice”
Cir. 1998)).
207
Id. at 1324.
208
Id. at 1320 (quoting SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular
Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
209
Id. (quoting Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193,
1204 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
210
73 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
211
Id. at 1581.
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existed between a narrower and broader meaning of a claim. To
resolve the question, the Federal Circuit announced a preference
for the narrower interpretation.212 Its reasoning was peculiar:
patents must provide “fair notice” of their scope, and the Federal
Circuit declared “the notice function of the claim to be best served
by adopting the narrower meaning.”213 Yet as a matter of logic, the
notice function is served merely by having a rule that resolves the
ambiguity flowing from equally valid constructions. That
ambiguity would have been similarly resolved by choosing the
broader interpretation. Nothing in Athletic Alternatives explained
just why narrower interpretations provide inherently greater notice
than broad interpretations. Nor did the Federal Circuit explain how
its policy decision to favor narrow patents was consistent with
encouraging innovation, which, after all, is the fundamental
purpose of the patent system. One can easily argue that a policy
favoring narrow patents reduces the rewards to inventors and
thereby discourages innovation. The Federal Circuit nevertheless
selected narrow interpretations.214
C. Knowledge of the Accused Device
Pre-Markman cases sometimes took the logical but impractical
position that claims were to be construed “without reference to the
accused device.”215 That approach was a relic of the view that an
objective interpretation of a patent would best be made without
knowing the kind of structure sought to be covered by the patent.
Other pre-Markman cases accepted reality, holding that claims are
“construed independent of the accused product,” but that “the
212

Id.
Id.
214
A related philosophy regarding the doctrine of equivalents was
expressed in Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420 (Fed. Cir.
1977), where the Federal Circuit considered an attempt to use the doctrine of
equivalents to cover a “foreseeable” problem in the claim language. The Federal
Circuit declared that “it is the patentee who must bear the cost of its failure to
seek protection for this foreseeable alteration of its claimed structure.” Id. at
1425.
215
E.g., SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
213
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particular accused product (or process) is kept in mind, for it is
efficient to focus on the construction of only disputed elements or
limitations in the claims.”216 After Markman, the Federal Circuit
recognized that constructions that were devoid of knowledge of the
infringement issues might not address the actual dispute. This, of
course, would produce the inefficient “whack-a-mole” process that
required a subsequent revisit of claim construction issues that trial
courts believed were resolved. The Federal Circuit eliminated all
uncertainty by expressly accepting that the trial court could
consider the accused product, and indeed, can be helped by that
evaluation.217 The result improved claim constructions by
sharpening the trial court’s focus and reducing the need for
constructions to be revisited.
VII. DISTRICT COURT REACTIONS
Claim construction at the district court level was impacted at
least as much by district court reactions to Markman and its
progeny as the Federal Circuit decisions. As soon as district courts
recognized that patent cases imposed the additional burden of a
separate hearing to evaluate patent claims, individual judges and
districts began to react and modify their practices accordingly.
A. Local Patent Rules
The first and most significant district court reaction to
Markman was the adoption of local rules that would regularize the
steps leading to Markman. Beginning with Northern California218
(a district with a penchant for lengthy and complicated rules for
every aspect of litigation), local patent rules began to dominate.
Such rules normally mandate initial disclosures identifying the
216

Scripps Clinic & Res. Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
217
E.g., Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442 F.3d
1322, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Pall Corp. v. Hemasure, Inc., 181 F.3d 1305,
1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
218
Patent Local Rules, U.S. DIST. COURT, N. DIST. CAL.,
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/localrules/patent (last updated Nov. 1, 2014).
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accused product or process and describing the plaintiff’s theory of
infringement, followed by an identification of the defendant’s
invalidity contentions. The process next includes identification of
disputed claim terms and exchange of the parties’ proposed
constructions, followed by briefing to the district court. The
practice is cumbersome and, at least in some cases, more involved
than is necessary, adding to the complexity and cost of even the
simplest patent case.
District court judges nevertheless welcomed such rules because
they freed individual judges from having to decide which
procedure was most appropriate for each case.219 Defendants liked
local rules because they mandated early disclosure of infringement
theories that previously might have been obtained only after
lengthy discovery battles. Plaintiffs with weak cases liked the rules
because the burden on defendants, merely to get a claim
interpretation, often encouraged early nuisance settlements.
Defense lawyers loved the rules because the need for early
invalidity contentions guaranteed extensive work before any
substantive ruling in the case. Eventually, twenty-eight districts
adopted local patent rules, including all major commercial
jurisdictions (with the notable exception of the District of
Delaware).220 Squabbles over the sufficiency of infringement
contentions then became the norm, along with massive invalidity
contentions. Motions to strike infringement and invalidity
contentions became the norm, and legions of patent litigators
became specialists in just the claim construction procedures of
popular patent districts, such as the Eastern District of Texas and
the Northern District of California.

219

The most common justification was “[l]ocal patent rules seek to advance
the orderly progression of patent litigation by requiring the parties ‘to crystallize
their theories of the case early in the litigation and to adhere to those theories
once they have been disclosed.’” Copper Innovations Group, LLC v. Nintendo
Co., No. 2:07CV1752, 2012 WL 628465, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2012)
(quoting Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices, Inc., No. C 95-1987 FMS, 1998
WL 775115, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 1998)).
220
The local patent rules across the country are gathered at
http://www.localpatentrules.com.
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B. The Obligation to Construe, and Limits on the Number of
Terms
Despite the local rules, district court judges quickly came to
realize that claim construction was a difficult and time-consuming
process, as even the simplest technology produced wrangling over
competing definitions of both common and uncommon words.
Most patent cases do not settle before claim construction, so most
cases require a hearing and a difficult opinion. Trial judges
naturally sought ways to limit the portion of their valuable
resources that were devoted to patent cases, and accordingly began
setting limits on the number of terms they were willing to construe,
either by saying that claim terms have their “plain meaning” or by
setting a limit on the number of terms to be construed and leaving
the parties to choose the most important terms. The result was O2
Micro, which ruled that “[w]hen the parties present a fundamental
dispute regarding the scope of a claim term, it is the court’s duty to
resolve it.”221 Realism also prevailed, because the Federal Circuit
also recognized that “district courts are not (and should not be)
required to construe every limitation present in a patent’s asserted
claims.”222 Trial courts now regularly limit the parties to ten or
fifteen claim terms in any Markman proceeding. Since many cases
involve disputes over many more terms, the result has been a
partial return to the pre-Markman days, with the jury presented
with trial arguments, and even trial expert testimony, on the
meaning of contested claim terms.223

221

O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351,
1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
222
Id.
223
In O2 Micro, the district court ruled that the term “only if” needed no
construction, id. at 1361, so “the district court left the jury free to consider” the
parties’ arguments. Id. at 1362. The plaintiff then “presented expert testimony to
support its argument” on the meaning of “only if.” Id. While the Federal Circuit
reversed in O2 Micro, id. at 1366, claim interpretation arguments before juries
are the natural result of limits on the quantity of terms for construction. Of
course, even under Markman some form of claim interpretation has always been
presented to juries, when the litigants argue their differing interpretations of the
claim constructions, especially in closing argument.
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VIII. TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS
Once the Supreme Court affirmed Markman’s removal of
claim construction from juries, the crucial remaining problem was
the lack of deference to trial court claim constructions. When the
Federal Circuit refused to modify its de novo review process in
Cybor, the issue continued to fester and produce repeated
criticisms. The issue was again revised sixteen years after Cybor in
Lighting Ballast Control v. Philips Electronics North America
Corp.,224 but the 1995 rule of Markman was not modified until the
Supreme Court finally spoke in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v.
Sandoz, Inc.225
A. Lighting Ballast
Lighting Ballast was the Federal Circuit’s en banc revisit of de
novo review. The Federal Circuit again solicited amicus briefs, this
time directed to whether Cybor should be overruled, whether
deference should be given to the district court’s claim construction,
and if so, how that deference should be afforded.226 The court
received thirty-eight amicus briefs, arguing approaches that
spanned the spectrum of potential results.227 The Federal Circuit, in
a decision authored by Judge Newman, one of the previous staunch
opponents of de novo review, concluded that the standard of Cybor
should be maintained, based upon stare decisis.228 Rejecting the
criticism of de novo review, the Federal Circuit decided that
“[t]here has been extensive experience of Cybor in action,”229 that
“no proponent of change has shown that de novo review of claim
construction is unworkable,”230 so there is “neither ‘grave
necessity’ nor ‘special justification’ for departing from Cybor.”231
224

744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
135 S. Ct. 831 (2015).
226
Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elec. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d
1272, 1277.
227
Id.
228
Id. at 1281, 1292.
229
Id. at 1281.
230
Id. at 1283.
231
Id. at 1286.
225
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Four judges, including the Chief Judge,232 dissented,233 but it was
all for naught. Cybor and the de novo review standard remained
unchanged. The stage was now set for Teva.
B. Teva
The issues in Teva centered on a dispute that should not exist in
the world of Vitronics: how to resolve the meaning of a common
technical term that had three accepted definitions. The claims
defined the invention in terms of “molecular weight,” which can be
“peak average molecular weight,” “number average molecular
weight,” or “weight average molecular weight.”234 The district
court took testimony from experts and concluded that the term
“molecular weight” was definite and meant “peak average
molecular weight.”235 The Federal Circuit reviewed the decision de
novo, disagreed, and ruled the claim indefinite.236 The Supreme
Court thus reviewed whether the district court’s ruling should have
been decided on the “clear error” standard applicable to findings of
fact under Rule 52.
The Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit in a sweeping
rebuff of Cybor and Lighting Ballast.237 Rejecting long-cherished
interpretations of Markman, the Supreme Court described its
Markman holding as recognition “that in patent construction,
subsidiary fact finding is sometimes necessary.”238 In that
circumstance, Rule 52 “requires appellate courts to review all such
subsidiary factual findings under the ‘clearly erroneous’
standard.”239 In doing so, the Supreme Court noted the obvious and
vindicated Judge Mayer’s dissents in Cybor and Phillips: “A
232

Id. at 1296.
The dissent contended that the Cybor approach “misapprehends the
Supreme Court’s guidance, contravenes the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and adds considerable uncertainty and expense to patent litigation.” Id. at 1297
(addressing Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448).
234
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 836 (2015).
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id. at 842.
238
Id. at 838.
239
Id.
233
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district court judge who has presided over, and listened to, the
entirety of a proceeding has a comparatively greater opportunity to
gain that familiarity than an appeals court judge who must read a
written transcript or perhaps just those portions to which the parties
have referred.”240
De novo review is therefore gone when the District Court
conducts a subsidiary fact finding, and a new claim construction
era has begun based upon a more realistic interpretation of claim
construction. The established and now comfortable proceedings
based on Vitronics and Philips no longer apply, and new
procedures and new strategies will have to be developed. Yet the
Supreme Court left the door open for the Federal Circuit to cling to
its old practices, when it limited its ruling to circumstances where a
district court examines extrinsic evidence, especially expert
testimony. “As all parties agree, when the district court reviews
only evidence intrinsic to the patent (the patent claims and
specifications, along with the patent’s prosecution history), the
judge’s determination will amount solely to a determination of law,
and the Court of Appeals will review that construction de novo.”241
Just how the interplay between extrinsic and intrinsic evidence will
occur after Teva remains to be seen. For now, two decades of
unrealistic treatment of extrinsic evidence have been relegated to
the compost heap.
CONCLUSION
As Yogi Berra aptly stated, “It’s tough to make predictions,
especially about the future.” Teva has upset the applecart, and
long-established claim construction precedent now has
questionable value. Recognizing that the uncertainty is great, the
following results appear likely in the future of claim construction:
First, the Federal Circuit will do all it can to preserve its de
novo precedent. Where the district court makes no express fact
findings, the Federal Circuit will decide that the trial court decision
was entirely based on legal conclusion, so no deference and no
240

Id. (citing similar statements by Judge O’Malley in her Lighting Ballast
dissent, 744 F.3d 1272, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (O’Malley, J., dissenting)).
241
Id. at 841.
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“clear error” evaluation is needed. Indeed, most initial decisions
rendered after Teva fit that mold—where the district court did not
describe use of any extrinsic evidence in the district court’s
decision, the Federal Circuit treated the matter as “business as
usual” and evaluated the case de novo.242 Litigants, however, will
take an entirely different view. Experts will experience a new
popularity in claim construction, both through submission of
declarations and through live testimony. The Federal Circuit may
well contend that de novo review is still proper when expert
testimony is provided by declaration (since it can review such
testimony from the same perspective as the district court), so we
can expect litigants to more frequently request live testimony at
hearings. Some litigants will test the limits of testimonial evidence,
even by proffering inventor testimony. And wily trial judges will
reduce their chance of reversal by accepting live testimony and
then preparing express “findings of fact” that rely on the
testimony. Regardless, experts will now have a role extending far
beyond merely explaining the technology. How the rules of
evidence will be applied and evaluated on appellate review is
likely to vary greatly across the courts.
Second, the Teva rule will slowly erode the “public notice”
aspect of claim construction. When the public generally and
competitors specifically are unable to predict the testimony at
Markman hearings, the fiction that claim interpretations are
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See Cadence Pharm., Inc. v. Exela Pharmasci, Inc., 780 F.3d 1364, 1371
(Fed. Cir. 2015); Mobile Ideas LLC v. Apple, Inc., 780 F.3d 1159, 1172–73
(Fed. Cir. 2015); Pacing Techs., LLC v. Garmin Int’l, Inc., 778 F.3d 1021, 1023
(Fed. Cir. 2015); In re Papst Licensing Digital Camera Patent Litig., 778 F.3d
1255, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Three early Federal Circuit cases cited the Teva
standard but did not commit to using the “clear error” standard. See Enzo
Biochem, Ind. v. Applera Corp., 780 F.3d 1149, 1155–56 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
Warsaw Orthopedic, Inc. v. NuVasive, Inc., 778 F.2d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2015); Fenner Inv., Ltd. v. Cellco P’ship, 778 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Two early Federal Circuit cases found a justification to follow de novo review
despite the presence of some extrinsic facts. See Vasudevan Software, Inc. v.
Microstrategy, Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 680–81 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (district court’s use
of stipulation from another litigation did not prevent de novo review); Eidos
Display, LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 779 F.3d 1360, 1365 (stating that extrinsic
evidence considered by district court was immaterial because the intrinsic record
is clear).
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predictable from the intrinsic evidence will fade. We can, however,
expect the Federal Circuit to use the need for public notice to
justify limits on testimony—limits that are not now apparent.”
Teva does not address other claim construction issues. Claim
construction will still occur separate from the jury’s evaluation of
infringement, so the whack-a-mole problem will continue. District
courts will still want to minimize their efforts, so they will retain or
even expand limits on the number of claims that can be interpreted,
leading to more claim interpretation arguments before juries.
District courts will still construe claims as a collage, mixing the
proposals of the parties with the court’s own views, preserving one
of the key elements of unpredictability. And the litigants and
courts will continue to argue the meaning of simple English
language terms such as “or,” “on,” or perhaps even “is.” Patent
claims are written in English, a language with a rich variety of
meaning for most every term. Uncertainty will continue to prevail.
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